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UNFAIR COMPETITION, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND
COPYRIGHTS
© Burton & Dorr 1978
By Robert 1)orr* and Duane Burton**
1. SUMMARY OVERVIEW
During the period ot this survey the Tenth Circuit considered
four cases involving patents, trademarks and unfair competition.
There were no published cases involving copyrights.,
First, in Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co.,2 the court held that a trademark owner who cannot afford to
advertise correctionally while another infringes his trademark can
recover, as general compensatory damages, an amount sufficient
to enable him to so advertise in the future. The court further held
that reverse confusion, in which the public is led to believe that
the prior user of a trademark is infringing the mark of the subse-
quent. user, is actionable
Big 0 sued Goodyear for infringement of its common law
trademark "BIG FOOT" and for unfair competition. Goodyear
contended that: (1) Big O's evidence of confusion was in the form
of reverse confusion and, therefore, was not actionable; (2) liabil-
ity for trademark infringement could not be imposed without a
showing that Goodyear intended to trade on the goodwill of Big
O or to represent Goodyear's products as being those of Big O's;
and (3) the recovery of expenses for corrective advertising should
be limited to those actually incurred prior to the trial. The court,
in response to Goodyear's contentions, stated that the logical
consequence of Goodyear's position would be the immunization
Partner, Burton & Dorr, B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970,
Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver.
** Partner, Burton & Dorr, B.S., 1951, Colorado State University; J.D., 1957, Univer-
sity of Colorado.
Eggenhofer v. Koury, Nos. 76-1817-76 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 1978), a copyright case,
made its second trip to the Tenth Circuit but was designated "Not for Routine Publica-
tion." Previously, the Tenth Circuit had remanded Eggenhofer's appeal from the denial
of a preliminary injunction to the district court for a written statement of findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The case, upon retrial, turned essentially upon matters of contract
rather than copyright law.
2 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976), cert.
dismissed, 434 U.S. 1052 (1978).
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from unfair competition liability of a company with a well-
established trade name and with the economic power to advertise
extensively for a product name taken from a competitor. Such
conduct constitutes unquestionably unfair competition. The
court did, however, reduce the amount of the judgment seventy-
five percent by relying upon the Federal Trade Commission prac-
tice that requires businesses which engage in misleading advertis-
ing to spend twenty-five percent of their advertising budget on
corrective advertising. 3 The $19,600,000 judgment of the District
Court, as modified by the reduction in damages. was, therefore,
upheld on appeal.
In Education Development Corp. v. The Economy Co.,4 the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that "Continuous
Progress" was not properly registered as a trademark because
when it is used with educational materials, it is merely descrip-
tive of a concept of education. In this case, the plaintiff had
commenced use of the words "Continuous Progress" in 1968 and
had obtained federal registration in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office in 1970. The court noted that plaintiff had used
"Continuous Progress" in its promotional material in that term's
ordinary sense to describe the educational concept present in the
product. Defendant's predecessor in interest had commenced
using the words "Continuous Progress" two years before plaintiff,
and the defendant had attempted to obtain federal registration
but had been rejected by the Patent and Trademark Office. De-
fendant successfully contended that "Continuous Progress" was
merely descriptive of educational material notwithstanding its
own prior attempt to register the term as a trademark.
In Celebrity, Inc. v. A & B Instrument Co., 5 the court af-
firmed the trial court's award of combined damages for patent
infringement and unfair competition. Fifty thousand dollars was
awarded to the company manufacturing the patented product,
and eighty thousand dollars was awarded to the company mar-
keting the device as damages for violation of the Oklahoma De-
ceptive Trade Practices Act.' Since the infringement was willful,
the district court trebled the damages for patent infringement
561 F.2d at 1375-76.
562 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1977).
573 F.2d 11 (10th Cir.), cert. filed 46 U.S.L.W. 3723 (1978).
OKLA. STAT. tit. 78, § 52.
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and also awarded attorneys' fees. Payment of a royalty on a prod-
uct frees that product from any further control under the patent.
Thus, upon payment of the royalty to the manufacturing com-
pany, the marketing company would not have been entitled to
any damages except for the infringer's violation of the Oklahoma
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Moreover, while a judge can in-
crease the damages awarded for patent infringement under fed-
eral law,7 if a jury is involved the jury must make an award of
punitive damages. Although the trial judge trebled the damages,,
no punitive damages were awarded because punitive damages are
not allowed under the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
In Eickmeyer v. Commissioner,' the court reversed the Tax
Court's ruling that the granting of assignments and "exclusive"
licenses by a patent owner were transfers of undivided interests
entitling the patent owner to long-term capital gain treatment
under Section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code. The court
found that the patent owner had granted non-exclusive licenses
rather than assignments of an undivided interest in a patent since
the patent owner (1) retained the power to create additional inter-
ests by making additional assigrnments and (2) retained the right
to payment of royalty based upon use, including not only pay-
ments by the patent owner's assignees or transferees, but also
subassignees. Additionally, the court noted that the transfers
made by the patent owner withheld in each instance the right to
exclude others from the use of the patent.'0
11. BIG 0 TIRE DEALERS, INC. V. GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO."
The recent Big 0 Tire Dealers case represents a classic in-
stance of trademark infringement, and reveals the disregard with
which the large competitor has come to treat the small. What
makes the case an illuminating example of modern unfair compe-
tition is the unique philosophy of the Big 0 franchise system and
the extreme degree to which Goodyear frustrated and disregarded
that philosophy.
7 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976).
See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976).
580 F.2d 39.5 (10th Cir. 1978).
' For further discussion of this case see notes 24-60 and accompanying text in the
Tax Overview, this issue.
i 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977), aff'g 408 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Colo. 1976).
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A. Background.
In 1962, the Big 0 Tire Dealers' franchise system was created
and its founders embraced a business philosophy which ad-
dressed major deficiencies in the tire industry. 2 Big 0 Tire Deal-
ers' goal was the marketing of private brand tires. The expansion
of the dealership network was substantial, 3 and in 1973 Big O's
goal of marketing a private brand tire became economically feasi
ble. Big 0 selected several trademarks, one of which was BIG
FOOT. to allow customers to readily identify Big O's product line
and to distinguish it from others." Once a distinctive trademark
had been created, Big 0 could develop in implementation of its
philosophy separate areas of goodwill-an "honest dealership"
goodwill and a "product line" goodwill." s
In April 1974, Big 0 began marketing BIG FOOT 60 and BIG
FOOT 70 tires.'6 Consonant with its philosophy of developing
superior product reputation, Big 0 provided a remarkable tire
guarantee. 7 Big 0 Tire Dealers also spent significant sums in the
development of television and radio commercials advertising the
BIG FOOT line of tires.' 8 At the time of the trial, Big O's total
net worth was approximately $200,000
The defendant, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co .11 sought a
! Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee at 7, Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 561 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Brief] That philosophy was
composed of the following elements: (1) there is a compelling need to deal honestly and
fairly with the public; (2) a successful franchise system requires sufficient and proper
guidance for independent dealers; and, (3) incentive and service are enhanced by allowing
franchise dealers to retain a greater portion of their profits.
"1 At the time of suit, the Big 0 Tire Dealers' organization was composed of approxi-
mately two hundred independent dealers in fourteen states. 408 F. Supp. at 1222.
1' See Arnold & Durkee, Trademark and Unfair Competition in Franchised Business
Operations, 59 TRADa4ARK Rsp. 896 (1969); Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43,
48-49 (9th Cir. 1971) (function of trademark).
" Brief at 8.
' The first BIG FOOT tire molds were manufactured in the fall of 1973; the first
interstate shipments of the tires, manufactured by Uniroyal, were in February 1974; BIG
FOOT tires were prominently displayed at a Reno, Nevada, tire convention in March
1974. In April 1974, Big 0 dealers began sales to the public. 408 F. Supp. at 1223.
'1 Aig 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Doc. No. 76-1199, Joint
Appendix p. 610-611a [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]. Upon product failure, Big
0 would replace free of charge any tire throughout its lifetime down to 2/32 of an inch of
tread.
" Joint Appendix, 630-31a, 639-641a
" Goodyear is the world's largest tire manufacturer, selling its tires as original equip-
ment and as replacements through a nationwide network of 1,700 Goodyear-owned retail
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trademark to "quickly personalize" its recently introduced Cus-
tom Polysteel Radial and considered the word BIGFOOT for use
in upcoming proposed nationwide television promotion as a dis-
tinctive "nickname" to distinguish its new tire from the "tire
clutter." 0 Despite the earlier discovery in its trademark search on
June 28, 1974, of the use of the mark BIG FOOT 21 by Big 0 Tire
Dealers, Goodyear selected BIGFOOT on July 10, 1974, for its
advertising campaign.2 2 During August 1974 Goodyear's regional
managers were advised of this campaign by Goodyear's vice-
president for advertising. The vice-president disclosed:
First, we are putting six million dollars behind the launch between
now and New Year's day .... Second, we are once again putting
most of our marbles on TV, because no other advertising medium
can be so efficient and so dramatic ... Third, we are going to back
up the advertising. . with national magazine ads, newspaper an-
nouncements, radio spots, point of sale displays, product literature,
promotional gimmicks, and sales training .... Starting on the
NFL Monday Night Football Game of September the 16th, and
roaring right on through the big year-end Bowl games, we will run
163 commercials in exclusive positions in major football and other
prime time telecasts . . . . [Wihat all this means is that we will
reach about 80 per cent of all males in the USA about five times a
month all during the fall introductory period. You think they won't
know about BIGFOOT? You bet they will!2
stores, approximately 4,600 authorized independent tire dealers and approximately
60,000-80,000 other independent tire dealers. 408 F. Supp. at 1223. For the year ending
December 31, 1975, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and domestic and foreign subsidiaries
had consolidated net sales of $5,452,500,000 (an increase of $196,226,000 over the previous
year) and total assets of $4,173,675,000. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Annual Report
1976, at 1, 26, 33.
Goodyear chose BIGFOOT because it was "distinctive and memorable," served as a
"memory device" and as a "handle" with which consumers could identify custom Poly-
steel tires with Goodyear. Joint Appendix 836a, 988a, 1056a.
U Joint Appendix, 2116a.
2" "On the cover of the page of the report it is shown that the mark searched was 'BIG
FOOT' for tires and that a full search was requested and conducted. Printed on the
face of Exhibit 299 is 'S.N. 010,921'-the serial number of the Plaintiff's now registered
trademark for Big 0 vehicle tires." Brief at 11.
" 408 F. Supp. at 1225.
For illustrations of the duty of care to be exercised in selecting a trademark, see
McNeill Labs. Inc. v. American Home Prods., 416 F. Supp. 804 (D.N.J. 1976); General
Foods Corp. v. Borden, Inc., 191 U.S.P.Q. 674 (N.D. Il. 1976); Jockey Int'l., Inc. v.
Burkard, 185 U.S.P.Q. 201 (S.D. Ca. 1975); Trademarks and the Concept of Greater Care,
5 PAT. L. RLzv. 325 (1973); Tanner, Exxorcising Esso-Name Change Brings Exxcedrin
Headaches and Costs Approxximately $100 Million, Wall St., J., Jan. 9, 1973, at 44, col.
1.
S408 F. Supp. at 1225-26.
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On August 24, 1974, Goodyear officials also received actual
notice from their Salt Lake City district manager that other tires,
not from Goodyear, displayed the name BIG FOOT." After var-
ious initial contacts, the president and two directors of Big 0 Tire
Dealers met on September 10, 1974, with Goodyear's vice presi-
dent for advertising and its manager of consumer marketing. In
that meeting the Big 0 officials made it clear that Big 0 objected
to any use of the BIG FOOT or BIGFOOT trademark by Good.
year.
tBig O's President] pointed out that the Big 0 dealers' organiza-
tion would be severely damaged if the dealers came to the conclusion
that Big 0 was not able to protect an exclusive right to use of this
trademark. The Big 0 representatives also made it clear that they
were not interested in money; but, that they were concerned about
preserving an exclusive use of this trademark."
Because the program "was too far along and too expensive to
stop," 2 the promotional campaign was continued as scheduled,
irrespective of Big O's interests and rights. Goodyear evidenced
a degree of smugness about the whole situation; a member of its
board of directors stated to a representative of Big 0 that Good-
year might obtain all the benefits it desired from the use of the
trademark during the pendency of litigation.
On September 16, 1974, on the Monday Night Football tele-
cast, Goodyear commenced its massive ten million dollar adver-
tising campaign.u Goodyear's own counsel described the advertis-
ing campaign as "an overwhelming saturation"'" and "an explo-
sion all over the country."' ' The resulting concurrent use of BIG-
FOOT by Goodyear and of BIG FOOT by Big 0 created various
forms of confusion in the marketplace. Some customers thought
" 408 F. Supp. at 1227. At this time Goodyear's commercials were still in the prepara-
tory stage. Joint Appendix at 950, 951a.
n 408 F. Supp. at 1227-28.
2 Id.- at 1228.
" Joint Appendix 1909a, see also 1130a-33a and 1067-75a.
u By August 31, 1975, (the closing of trial), Goodyear had spent $9,690,029 advertis-
ing "BIGFOOT." 561 F.2d at 1368. Compare Phoenix Mfg. Co. v. Plymouth Mfg. Co., 286
F. Supp. 321 (D. Mass. 1968) (the larger competitor waged the "biggest advertising cam-
paign in its history" knowingly using the smaller competitor's trademark) with Westward
Coach Mfg. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 388 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1968) (distinguishable because
the smaller competitor had no goodwill, use of same trademark was on dissimilar product,
and mark was weak).
n Joint Appendix at 313a.
3 Joint Appendix at 523a.
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their Big 0 BIG FOOT tires were manufactured by Goodyear or
that Big 0 dealers were somehow associated with Goodyear.
When other potential customers came to Big 0 dealers asking for
BIGFOOT (Goodyear's tire was a radial tire), salesmen had to
explain that Big O's BIG FOOT was a bias belted tire. "The
necessity for such an explanation gave an obvious negative qual-
ity to such customer contact."" Because of Goodyear's continued
and voluminous advertising and because of the disparity in size
between the companies, an implication of a wrongful and dis-
honest use arose from Goodyear's advertising-it appeared to
members of the public that Big 0 had stolen Goodyear's trade-
mark!32 Writing for the trial court, Judge Matsch summarized
these events: "The saturation was persistent, consistent and
complete. Goodyear made no effort to avoid sending its message
into the area already occupied by Big O's product. Big 0 was
simply overrun and overwhelmed."
B. Legal Theories of Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.
Prevailing on theories of trademark infringement and trade-
mark disparagement in the ensuing action,34 Big 0 Tire Dealers,
Inc. was awarded by the jury compensatory damages of
$2,800,000, punitive damages of $16,800,000,11 and was granted a
full injunction against Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT. Goodyear's
use of the identical trademark, BIGFOOT, on an identical prod-
uct line, vehicle tires, constituted a per se trademark infringe-
ment. 6 Goodyear's conduct also constituted what the court chose
" 408 F. Supp. at 1229.
'Id at 1230. The court remarked that Goodyear's knowledge of Big O's mark and
the scope of Goodyear's advertising raised a presumption that Goodyear officers must have
foreseen these consequences Id.
" Id. at 1240.
An accounting for profits was denied the plaintiff. An accounting is awarded where
(1) the remedy at law is inadequate, (2) the wrongdoer is unjustly enriched, or (3) the
deterrence of willful infringement and public protection are deemed necessary. The court
determined that the punitive damages awarded served as a sufficient deterrent and that
plaintiff was not entitled to an accounting of profits. Id. at 1241-42.
" Goodyear, however, prevailed on plaintiff's allegation of false designation of origin
under § 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1946), because it had made no effort
to pass its tires off as those of Big 0. 408 F. Supp. at 1224-25. The jury instruction fol
this cause of action was narrowly drafted by the court to embrace only "palming off"
situations. Id. at 1247. The court seemed to neglect the expansive reading § 43a has been
and is given.
" Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT created instant confusion in the consuming publo
1979
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to call trademark disparagement. Disparagement was defined in
the jury instructions as follows:
[No. 17, Disparagement]
To establish a claim for trademark disparagement, the plain-
tiff must show by the preponderance of the evidence:
1. That the defendant published some false statement or
statements to.the plaintiff's customers or potential customers
which could reasonably be understood to cast doubt or confu-
sion about the validity of plaintiff's trademark.
2. That the defendant acted with malice.
3. That such false statements had an adverse economic ef-
fect upon the plaintiff's business.
[No. 19, Malice]
To act with malice means to act with the intent to vex, injure
or annoy."
The disparagement instruction followed no direct precedent,
yet, as the court stated: "there is nothing which is really new or
novel, conceptually, in the elements of this theory. "31 Addition-
ally, the court noted that business goodwill is protectable against
the effects of false advertising.39 Analogizing to the law of defama-
tion, the district court stated:
The facts of this case fit within these traditional principles.
Some of Goodyear's advertising expressly said that BIGFOOT tires
were available only from Goodyear. All of it had the effect of creat-
ing that impression. Big 0 was selling and offering for sale tires
called BIG FOOT. That extrinsic fact made Goodyear's advertising
false. The additional extrinsic facts of the differences in the methods
"[t]oday, the Keystone of that portion of unfair competition law which relates to trade-
marks is the avoidance of a likelihood of confusion in the minds of the buying public." J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 2:3 at 46 (1973) (citing Safeway
Stores, Inc. v. Safeway Properties, Inc., 307 F.2d 495 (2nd Cir. 1962)).
1 408 F. Supp. st 1248. The instructions also defined the term publish ("Words are
published when they are communicated or circulated in any manner to any person other
than the officers of the plaintiff," i.e., Goodyear's use of BIGFOOT in its advertising) and
stated that in determining whether the use of BIGFOOT in Goodyear's advertising cast
doubt upon the plaintiff's rights to use BIG FOOT, the plain and natural meaning of the
words used in the plain and popular sense in which the consuming public would under-
stand them should be considered. See Nims, Unfair Competition by False Statements or
Disparagement, 19 CoRmL Q. 63 (1933); Note, Injury to Public Relations by a Non-
competitor, 41 ILL. L. Rxv. 661 (1947).
408 F. Supp. at 1233.
I d. at 1234 (citing Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press, Inc., 106 F.2d 229
(10th Cir. 1939)). See also, Trans World Accounts, Inc. v. Associated Press, 425 F. Supp.
814 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Steams v. McManis 543 S.W. 2d 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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,)f advertising used by the two companies and the difference in their
size, created the innuendo of an improper and unauthorized use of
BIG FOOT by Big 0. Big 0 had the exclusive right to the use of BIG
FOOT as a trademark for tires. The result of the reasonable implica-
tion from Goodyear's advertising was the disparagement of Big O's
trademark."
C. Damages
As stated above, Big 0 was awarded compensatory damages
of $2,800,000 and punitive damages of $16,800,000. Compensatory
damages were awarded for the diminution of Big O's goodwill due
to the acts of Goodyear. Specifically, the jury was allowed to
consider in its determination of damages the plaintiff's conten-
tion that it would be required to conduct an informational adver-
tising campaign "to place Big 0 Tire Dealers, Inc. in whatever
position with respect to the words BIG FOOT for tires that it may
have enjoyed prior to [Goodyear's advertising]."'" The damages
were apparently calculated as a percentage of the cost of Good-
year's advertising. 2 That this method of assessing damages had
never been used before in a trademark infringement or trademark
disparagement case did not disturb the court. Since the fact of
damage as evidenced in the resulting consumer confusion was
established with reasonable certainty, the trial court indicated
that the wrongdoer should bear the risk as to the uncertainty of
measuring that damage.
3
The court treated summarily Goodyear's contention that it
should be granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict for
plaintiff's alleged failure to provide evidence of plaintiff's reduc-
tion of goodwill or evidence supporting compensatory damages.
The court stated:
Whether the wrong done by Goodyear should be characterized as
common law trademark infringement or trademark disparagement,
408 F. Supp. at 1234.
"Id. at 1231.
2 Big 0 Tire Dealers were represented in 14 of the 50 states, or 28% of the states;
28% of the cost of Goodyear's $10,000,000 nationwide saturation advertising is $2,800,000.
Id. This was not an unprecedented method of damage calculation. See Maytag Co. v
Meadows Mfg. Co., 45 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1930); Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Leader Press,
Inc., 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946); Compania Pelineon De Navegacion, S.A. v. Texas Petroleum Co., 540 F.2d 53 (2nd
Cir. 1976); D. Doass, THE LAw ov REMEDIES, § 6.7 at 505 n.7, 8 (1973).
0 408 F. Supp. at 1232. The Tenth Circuit reduced the amount of damages by a
substantial 75%. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
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the result of it has been confusion in the minds of the public with
respect to the relationship between Big 0 and Goodyear. That con-
fusion did not exist before September 16, 1974. That confusion is,
in itself, damage. The appearance of dishonesty and wrongful con-
duct by Big 0 harms its reputation within the trade and with the
public. It is reasonable to redress that wrong by giving the plaintiff
enough money to conduct an advertising program of its own."
The jury award of punitive damages was supported by evi-
dence upon which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt
that Goodyear acted with malice or a wanton and reckless disre-
gard of the plaintiff's rights.
What Goodyear did was to determine that the plaintiff was an
insignificant competitor and that Goodyear's investment of time,
money and effort was too great to give up the use of the BIGFOOT
material even though it would clearly damage and perhaps destroy
the plaintiff's use of its trademark. Goodyear then proceeded with
an intentional and deliberate infringement of the plaintiff's trade-
mark. In short, Goodyear elected to ignore completely the property
rights of Big 0. It is difficult to characterize such conduct in any
manner more favorable than as a wanton and reckless disregard of
the plaintiff's rights."
Moreover, because of the disparity in size between the two com-
petitors, the court said that Goodyear should be presumed to
have foreseen the results of its conduct.
Having unleashed this extraordinary effort to identify the name
BIGFOOT with this Goodyear tire and the defendant company,
after learning of the Big 0 BIG FOOT tires, the officers at Goodyear
must be presumed to have foreseen that one of the consequences of
such concurrent but disproportionate use would be the creation of
an innuendo that Big 0 was trading off of Goodyear in violation of
the law."
Thus, the $19.6 million award did not represent Big O's specific
lost sales but rather the extent to which its business reputation
and goodwill were harmed and the degree to which Goodyear's
injurious conduct reflected a total disregard of Big O's rights.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Judge Matsch's analysis:
Goodyear argues a finding of malice is not supported by the
record in this case. We disagree. The record shows that on January
408 F. Supp. at 1232 (emphasis added).
, Id. at 1233. But "[while the mere difference in size and economic power between
competitors is not unfair, the competition becomes unfair if that power is used with a
complete disregard of the property rights of the smaller company." Id. at 1232.
0 Id. at 1230.
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2, 1975, after the filing of this lawsuit, Goodyear modified its
"Bigfoot" television advertising by adding "only from Goodyear."
The record shows Goodyear knew of Big O's "Big Foot" tires at least
by August 26, 1974, and there was adequate time to remove refer-
ence to "Bigfoot" from Goodyear's advertising before the September
16, 1974 telecast."
D. Conclusion
Factually, Big 0 Tire Dealers illustrates an instance in which
an enormous competitor effectively wields an unfair tool of com-
petition with absolute disregard for the rights of a less potent
competitor. The unfair tool was the use of a consciously misap-
propriated trademark-the hallmark of another competitor
which symbolized its reputation for honesty and fair dealing and
its product integrity-in a massive advertising scheme which
Goodyear knew would destroy the value of the trademark. Good-
year's wanton and reckless disregard of Big O's rights can be
made no more manifest than through reiteration of the fact that
Goodyear used Big O's BIG FOOT trademark notwithstanding
(1) actual notice to Goodyear executives from one of its own tire
dealers, and (2) meetings between officials of Goodyear and Big
0 in which the rights of Big 0 were clearly made known. 8
The legal analysis of Big 0 Tire Dealers represents a signifi-
cant step towards the protection of the efforts of a small competi-
tor. The efforts of Big 0 to develop goodwill and reputation were
essentially recognized by the courrt as property rights9 embodied
in its use and development of the trademark BIG FOOT; as such,
these efforts were protectable against disparaging advertising.
What the court recognized tacitly was Big O's right to conduct a
competitive enterprise and Goodyear's duty not to interfere with
that endeavor through unfair methods of competition. Because
Goodyear's advertising, creating instant reverse confusion, was
an unlawful usurpation of a small competitor's efforts to develop
561 F.2d 1365, 1373. Goodyear's disregard for Big O's rights was evident in its
attitude towards the legal resolution of their respective rights. At one point, with full
knowledge of Big O's BIG FOOT, Goodyear suggested it would bring suit against Big 0.
When it was suggested that Big 0 might bring suit, Goodyear stated that the case would
take long enough to allow Goodyear to reap the benefits from its proposed advertising.
408 F. Supp. at 1229. The ability of Big 0 to obtain legal protection for its trademark was
an obviously minor consideration.
" "In short, Goodyear elected to ignore completely the property rights of Big 0." Id.
at 1233.
" 408 F. Supp. at 1232.
1979
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and maintain favorable customer contacts, Big 0 Tire Dealers,
Inc. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. stands as notice that large
competitors cannot persist in an attitude of indifference toward
the rights of other competitors.
